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The proliferation of mobile devices in the BRIC countries has prompted 
them to develop policies to manage the security of these devices. In China, 
mobile devices are a primary tool for payments. As a result, China instituted in 
2017 a cyber security policy that applies to mobile devices giving China broad 
authority to manage cyber threats. The United States has a similar need for a 
cyber policy. Mobile devices are likely to become a primary payment tool in the 
United States soon. DHS has also identified a need for more effective security 
policy in mobile devices for government operations. This work proposes a 
certification program for mobile devices that can achieve the same level of 
security as China’s policy without the threats to privacy and intellectual property. 
It will also afford the United States a more authoritative position to shape global 
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The proliferation of mobile devices in the BRIC countries has prompted 
significant thought and policymaking with respect to mobile device security in the 
developed and developing world alike. In the BRICS Countries, Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa (since 2011), their position on the world stage is 
moving toward being among the countries that set precedents for international 
law and the countries that lead multilateral actions. China has instituted their 
Network Security Act of the People’s Republic of China, for example, which 
outlines rights of the government to take nearly any action deemed to be 
necessary to protect the ‘societal public interest,’ including access to source 
code. This Act was implemented following the tremendous increase in the use of 
mobile devices capable of financial transactions. This increase constitutes 
significant growth in the size of the front of vulnerability to a cyberattack. While 
China’s Act provides a unique legal framework for responding to cyber threats, it 
does not outline a specific method by which devices can be developed more 
securely or have improved security in operation. Furthermore, the reach of that 
law is well beyond what would comport with the United States Constitution.  
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 The developed world has adopted mobile devices for payment at a slower 
rate. As a result, there has been less dialogue regarding how to create a national 
security standard for these devices. The rate of adoption of mobile devices and 
other ‘internet of things’ devices, as well as cyber incidents in the BRICS 
countries, is prompting discussion of their own respective cyber policies. While 
their policies are not directly adoptable by the United States, they do provide a 
reference point for developing a policy in the United States with similar purposes.  
This work will argue that the data on mobile transactions in the United 
States shows that its insecurity represents a substantial economic cost worthy of 
being ameliorated. It will then outline and analyze the implications of the cyber 
policies or policy proposals in the BRICS countries, with particular emphasis on 
China’s. Finally, it will propose a policy mechanism for the United States that 
could accomplish the same security standards without the same degree of risk to 
intellectual property that more severe policies pose and be within the bounds of 
United States law.  
Chapter 1 will discuss the data on the adoption of mobile payments in the 
United States to show the rate of the growth of the surface area of vulnerability. It 
will argue that the number is likely to become significant enough that the security 
of these devices must be taken seriously. Chapter 2 will discuss the policies 
already implemented and those currently in development in Brazil, India, and 
China. In the countries of Russia and South Africa, their policies are not as well 
developed and therefore are not as useful to analyze for this purpose. Chapter 2 
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will also explain the motivations and scope of each law. Chapter 3 will propose a 
certification program that the United States could implement to standardize 
security rules for mobile devices. It will also discuss the potential benefits of this 
program, including overcoming barriers to adopting mobile devices as primary 
forms of payment.  
This certification program will allow the United States to avoid the 
appearance of bestowing an advantage on domestic businesses over foreign 
ones in recommending security principles. This, in turn, will put the United States 
in a better position to shape cyber-norms. A certification program would require 
voluntary private-sector participation to be effective. One barrier to the adoption 
of mobile payments in the United States has been perceptions that credit cards 
are more secure than mobile payments. This policy could also help to change 
that perception by demonstrating that security is a priority for technology 
companies as well as the government in a time when personal data is frequently 
compromised.  
Mobile transactions are defined as any transaction conducted using a 
mobile device. Mobile transactions are increasing in dollar amount and frequency 
along with most forms of payment according to the Federal Reserve Payments 
Survey. Checks are the only form of payment on the decline. Despite their 
growth, mobile payments still represent a small portion of all payments in the 
United States. The barriers to more widespread adoption are declining due to 
improving perceptions of their security, faster adoption among younger 
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consumers, and an increase in retailers and restaurants accepting mobile 
payments. In 2014, only 3% of retailers accepted Apple Pay, but by 2018, 50% 
did according to eMarketer, a market research firm. The perceptions of security 
concerns are being combatted through advertising. Additionally, younger 
consumers (18-35) are much more likely to use and trust mobile payments, as 
reported in the Economist. This group of users makes up roughly 40% of the 
working population currently [Brookings, 2018]. Assuming generations following 
this one are similarly apt to use mobile payments, the vast majority of the 
workforce will be accustomed to mobile payments as a main form of payment by 
2050, using projections reported by the Pew Research Center. At present, the 
global mobile payments market is over $3 trillion USD. Assuming consumers 
continue to use mobile payments at current rates, mobile transactions are likely 
eventually to represent a multi-trillion-dollar portion of domestic consumption, and 
mobile devices will likely be a primary location for sensitive financial information. 
Mobile payments will only account for under 2% of all retail and restaurant 
transactions in 2019 according to a Forbes estimate. Given their projected 
growth, it is an ideal time to implement a policy to manage security standards for 
these devices in preparation for their more widespread adoption.  
Mobile payments have already reached wide-spread adoption in China 
and are being rapidly embraced in the rest of the developing world. This is likely 
due to the technology available at their stage of economic development. The 
same payment systems that are available in the United States, such as PayPal 
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and Apple Pay, are available or soon to become available in Brazil, India, and 
China. Consequently, the security concerns that their policies are designed to 
mitigate will need to be addressed in the United States by the time mobile 
transactions reach widespread adoption.  
China’s network security law, The Network Security Act of the People’s 
Republic of China, essentially states that it has the right to any information about 
any devices that run on any network inside China. This includes source code. 
This represents a significant risk to intellectual property for any company doing 
business inside China. The motivation for this approach seems to be ensuring 
that security interests supersede any others when vulnerabilities are discovered. 
Brazil and India prioritize privacy in their laws, which are much more akin to the 
European Union’s General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). They rely on the 
public-private partnership between firms and seek to conform to international 
norms on data privacy.  
The relative positions of China, the European Union, Brazil, and India help 
to explain the priorities of their cybersecurity laws. China is positioned as a rising 
economic power through the development of their financial sector, technology 
sector, and through expanding their military. The other listed countries fall under 
the security umbrella of the United States. While privacy is not unimportant in the 
United States, security is of much greater concern to China, and must be the 
priority in a cyber policy that the United States adopts as well. China operates as 
a regional hegemon with security priorities that often clash with those of United 
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States and its allies. While policies in the spirit of the GDPR are aimed at 
mitigating exploitation of personally identifiable information for financial gain, 
China’s policy is as oriented toward mitigating threats from state actors as much 
as criminals and other non-state actors. The United States as a hegemon must 
focus on this as well. The United States cannot adopt the heavy-handed 
approach of China within its legal boundaries. This means that the United States 
requires significant participation from the makers of mobile devices to achieve 
similar security objectives. It must leverage natural incentives to protect users of 
mobile devices from threats originating from the exploitation of personal data as 
well as from adversarial states. The certification program proposed in this work 
can achieve these goals.  
The certification program would require compliance with a set of security 
recommendations that can be updated to counter newly discovered threats or 
resolve emergent vulnerabilities. As a beginning point, this work recommends 
implementing the 10 controls described in Cavallari et al and forcing software 
updates to be applied automatically within a certain timeframe. The goal will be to 
prevent users from rooting their devices and in so doing potentially removing 
protections or avoiding critical security updates. The security standards that 
appear in this set should be: 




2) Addressable by mobile device creators through patches or updated 
hardware in new devices 
3) Solution and business-goal agnostic 
This approach to mobile device security is beneficial to consumers by 
creating a metric for security that can serve as a basis for competition between 
mobile devices.  It is beneficial to the creators of mobile devices by incentivizing 
users to upgrade their phones regularly to avoid using devices with outdated 
security capabilities. From a domestic standpoint, this approach is compatible 
with consumer protection as well as business motivations. 
Internationally, the United States has struggled at times to rally sufficient 
soft power to advocate against devices or infrastructure developed by non-United 
States entities. Huawei is the most pronounced example. While the United States 
has insisted that Huawei hardware should not be used in our mobile networks 
and that any hardware created in China be removed from United States 
Government systems, other countries (notably, the other ‘Five-Eyes’ countries) 
did not immediately find the concerns voiced by the United States as compelling. 
Huawei owns a larger portion of 5G related patents than companies in the United 
States and has argued that the United States is trying to advantage its domestic 
businesses under the guise of security. A formalized mechanism to recommend 
security standards that are based only on security strengthens the position to 
advocate for policies that happen to go against the interests of a particular mobile 
device creator, be they foreign or domestic.  
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The proposed policy can improve the ability of the United States to 
respond to security concerns in the mobile space and influence norms toward 
particular security standards. It accomplishes much of what China’s policy can 
accomplish without compromising intellectual property. It will also facilitate the 
United States’ advocacy of security standards to comport with a model of the 























 Mobile devices have not yet become a primary tool for consumer 
spending. Perceptions over their security and consumer habits around credit 
cards in the United States seem to be hindering the rate of mobile payment 
adoption for retailers and restaurants [Economist, 2018]. However, mobile 
devices are useful for remote payments as well as in-person payments at 
restaurants and retailers. Consequently, the overall usage of mobile payments is 
growing without yet replacing credit cards for retail. An estimate from Forbes 
finds that mobile payments will account for under 2% of all mobile retail and 
restaurant consumption in 2019. However, the total amount of money involved in 
transactions conducted by mobile devices is projected to be over $141 billion for 
2019 [Statista, 2015]. Other projections are similar. If mobile devices become the 
primary tool for in-person retail and restaurant payments as well as remote 
payments and peer-to-peer transfers, then the measures to keep these devices 
secure will be much more important. This day is likely to come. 
10 
 
 There are three main barriers to transactions conducted via mobile 
devices becoming as common or more common than credit and debit cards. The 
first is that retailers and restaurants are generally equipped for credit cards but 
are not equipped for mobile payments. The second is that there is a perception 
that credit and debit cards are more secure than mobile payments. They are not; 
why they are not will be discussed in Chapter 3. The third is simply that the 
largest group of consumers is simply more accustomed to credit and debit cards 
and they have no clear incentive to change this.  
 This section will show that these barriers are each being overcome and 
that current adoption trends are likely to lead to mobile devices overtaking credit 
and debit cards as the primary forms of payment for remote payments, peer-to-
peer transfers, and in-person retail and restaurant purchases. The first barrier is 
being overcome through various technology companies innovating cost-effective 
solutions for businesses to adopt. While a large portion of retailers still do not 
accept mobile payments, the proportion that do has grown rapidly, and continues 
to grow. The second and third barriers are somewhat intertwined. The 
perceptions over the insecurity of mobile devices are being combated through 
marketing and innovation, though it is younger consumers (18-35) that seem to 
be most receptive to this message. Similarly, while this portion of consumers 
account for less than half of all consumption, they are much more in the habit of 
using mobile payments according to surveys reported by the Economist. 
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Consequently, as this set of consumers grows in proportion of consumption, 
mobile payments will grow along with them.  
 This section will also discuss data on China’s, India’s, and Brazil’s 
adoption of mobile devices to provide context to the mobile payment ecosystem 
and the conditions under which each of these countries chose to implement their 
respective cybersecurity laws.  




 Support for mobile payment options in retail and restaurants are being 
adopted rapidly, with Apple Pay leading the charge. Even though mobile 
payments still do not account for a very large portion of retail sales, their 
availability is growing rapidly. It is possible that at present this is no longer a 
barrier to the adoption of mobile payments over credit and debit cards, though it 
does slow down the rate of adoption. Trends from the Federal Reserve 
Payments Study 2018 show that checks are on the decline while all other forms 
of payment are increasing as overall consumption has been increasing.  
 In 2014, Apple Pay launched, and was accepted by 3% of retailers. In 
2017, only 36% of retailers accepted any form of mobile payment [Forester 
Research, Inc., 2017]. In 2018, Apple Pay was an option at 50% of retailers and 
restaurants and in 2019, Apple claimed that that number is now 65%. More than 
80% of retailers support or intended to support Apple Pay and 73% support or 
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intended to support Google Pay by December of 2018 [Boston Retail Partners, 
2019]. Other, less popular options include Samsung Pay, Pay Pal, Chase Pay, 
and branded payment services such as Starbucks.  
 In addition to retail, mobile payments are used for peer-to-peer transfers 
and remote payments. Remote payments are by far the largest portion of 
payments made by mobile devices, projected to be worth an estimated $90.6 
billion in 2019 [Statista, 2015]. This is more than double the number from 2014. 
Peer-to-peer transfers are the smallest segment, projected to be worth around 
$16.8 billion in 2019.  
 For the most part, mobile payment services have been adopted sufficiently 
so that they can be used to perform the same functions as credit cards, debit 
cards, cash, and checks. While there are still retailers and restaurants at which 
mobile payment services are unavailable, the number who do not appears to be 
shrinking rapidly. Nonetheless, mobile payments are not representing a large 
portion of retail commerce. If the lack of availability of mobile payment support is 
a barrier to their adoption, it soon will not be.  
China 
 
 China never chose to adopt credit and debit cards as primary forms of 
payment. By the point in their economic development at which average 
consumers were well empowered to consume, mobile technology was largely 
available and so mobile payments were a natural choice. In 2016, China’s mobile 
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payments constituted $5.5 trillion in amount and 125 billion in quantity [Financial 
Times, 2017]. In 2018, roughly 83% of all transactions in China were made via 
mobile devices [Daxue Consulting, 2019]. The year-over-year growth is, as would 
be expected, reaching a plateau. Even in rural China mobile payments have 
significant penetration, with about 47% of residents in rural China regularly 
utilizing mobile payments [Daxue Consulting, 2019].  
 To achieve this level of frequency at retailers as well as independent 
vendors, mobile payment services in China utilize Quick Response (QR) codes 
regularly. The most prevalent mobile payment services in 2019 are Tenpay 
(which includes WeChat Pay and QQ Wallet) and AliPay. Apple Pay has not 
reached the same level of utilization. The struggle of Apple Pay might be due to 
the fact that retailers need to purchase additional technology to facilitate Near 
Field Communication (NFC) transactions. With QR codes, the buyer can simply 
scan the seller’s code, or the seller can scan the code for the buyer’s mobile 
wallet and select the amount to charge against the wallet [Daxue Consulting, 
2019]. Android has higher penetration in China than Apple, which may also 
contribute to Apple’s struggle. However, Samsung Pay and Google Pay (formerly 
Android Pay) are not as prevalent either. Domestic payment services are 
significantly more utilized than foreign-developed ones. China remains the 






 India does not use mobile payments to the degree that China does, but it 
seems to be poised to adopt them at a rate similar to China in the near future. 
Like China, India is skipping the adoption of credit and debit cards as a means of 
payment. India is developing mobile payment infrastructure rapidly and the 
demonetization of their higher-denomination currency has provided an incentive 
for the adoption of mobile payments. India is the fastest growing mobile 
payments market. Between 2017 and 2018 there was a 39.7% increase in the  
number of people using mobile payments, and the trend is expected to continue 
in 2019 [Kats, 2018].  
 India is implementing the Universal Payments Interface (UPI) developed 
by the National Payment Corporation of India. UPI is intended to make mobile 
devices as efficient a tool for payments as possible. It uses QR codes, like 
China’s payment services, allows consumers and merchants to initiate 
transactions, and avoids the need for new hardware development.  
 The largest payment service in India is the Indian-developed Paytm, but 
foreign-created payment services are also seeking penetration into India’s 
market [Sengupta, 2019]. It is growing rapidly but has not matured to the level of 







 Brazil has a less mature market for mobile payments than China or India 
but is leading Latin America both in adoption of mobile payments and in mobile 
payment innovation [Visa Innovation Center, 2019]. Brazil’s approach is unique in 
the BRIC countries and very much tied to their economic position in Latin 
America. Brazil will have an estimated 141.6 million mobile phone users in 2019, 
representing a little bit less than 70% of the population, demonstrating significant 
growth over the last few years [eMarketer and AP, 2015]. Roughly 70% of 
Brazilians were banked in 2017, but this only represented a small amount of 
growth from the previous year [World Bank, 2018]. In the context of the number 
of banked people, Brazil is focusing on making payments easier with their 
financial technology (fintech) innovations including mobile devices to bring more 
of the population into the banking system. For Brazil, mobile payment technology 
is also a means to help those who are banked utilize these technologies more. It 
is expected that mobile phone penetration will outpace banking penetration. As a 
result, mobile wallets, wherein electronic money is loaded using cash, offers a 
means for Brazilians to access some financial services without needing to be 
banked. While mobile payments have not reached the level of India much less 
China, they are poised to grow rapidly, and Brazil has prepared for this through 




Perceptions over Security for Mobile Devices in the United States 
 
 One reason reported by consumers in the United States for choosing not 
to utilize mobile payment services is that they believe they are less secure than 
card payments [Economist, 2018]. In addition to this, in 2015 a survey published 
by ISACA of 900 cybersecurity experts from around the world showed that a 
large majority of 87% of them believed that mobile payment breaches were going 
to increase in the following year. Their concerns were mainly with respect to 
using public WIFI when making payments or transmitting related data, lost or 
stolen devices, and phishing. Despite these concerns, 42% of them had in fact 
engaged in mobile transactions that year. With the right education and 
understanding of mobile device security, users can mitigate these concerns with 
relative ease.  
 Perceptions of mobile devices being less secure than traditional forms of 
payment is somewhat self-fulfilling. If mobile devices are perceived to be less 
secure than their more traditional payment counterparts, then it is more difficult to 
cultivate a culture of security around them because there is less reason to use 
mobile devices for payments. The 2015 ISACA survey found respondents agreed 
that teaching teenagers and potentially younger users of mobile devices to use 
them effectively would help to alleviate this.  
 In the United States, the Deloitte 2016 Global Mobile Consumer Survey 
showed that the belief that mobile devices were not sufficiently secure to be used 
for payments dropped from 54% of respondents in 2015 to 40% in 2016. Deloitte 
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reported in 2018 that this had climbed to 42%, tied with a perceived lack of 
benefit of using them over cards. However, the perceived benefits of using 
mobile devices for payments increased among consumers who had used mobile 
payments [Holm et al, 2018]. As Deloitte notes, it is not the case that cards are 
more secure than mobile devices for payments. As users adopt them, the 
common understanding of their benefits should become adopted as well.  
In Sum 
 
 Mobile devices are being used for mobile payments at greater frequency. 
The United States has a high level of banking and mobile device penetration, but 
credit and debit cards account for the preponderance of payments. There are 
three barriers preventing mobile devices from gaining wider adoption as a means 
of payment. The first is a slow pace of retailers and restaurants adopting the 
technology to provide mobile payment services. The second is that the belief that 
they are not as secure as credit and debit cards is reducing consumers’ 
perceived benefit from adopting mobile payments. The third, which is closely 
related to the second, is that consumers habitually use credit and debit cards and 
are resistant to adopt a new technology, since to many of them there is no 
compelling reason to make this change.  
 Surveys of consumer behavior and perceptions around mobile devices 
show that consumers who utilize mobile payments are far more likely to perceive 
a benefit over credit and debit cards and that younger consumers, who are 
projected to account for roughly 40% of consumers in 2020 are particularly more 
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likely to utilize mobile payments. Therefore, mobile payments in the United 
States are likely to grow in popularity with consumers as opposed to cards and 
represent a much more substantial portion of consumers in the short-term.  
 Adopting the technologies that allow consumers to use mobile payments 
is still more difficult for retailers in the United States than it would be in India or 
China due to the variety of competing services that tend to keep a measure of 
exclusivity on these services. India has developed the Universal Payments 
Interface and China’s payment services utilize Quick Response codes to make it 
as easy as possible to unify digital payment services and reduce the cost to 
retailers and restaurants. Though the United States has not done either of these, 
there are growing partnerships among mobile payment service providers, and the 
current Point of Sale technologies accommodate all of the major payment 
services. This is more expensive for restaurants and retailers, but nonetheless 
does not prevent the adoption of mobile payments in the United States.  
 China represents a mature state of mobile payments as a main tool of 
consumption. India is following closely behind, with some unique motivators to 
incentivize adopting mobile devices. In particular, India has an underbanked 
population with high mobile device penetration and demonetization of their 
higher-denomination currency. Brazil is using mobile technologies to improve 
banking penetration and is poised to have consumers using digital payments 
primarily once they are positioned to utilize the financial services that are 
becoming available. The United States, as an already developed economy, is 
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moving in this direction slowly but steadily. Mobile payments are most likely 

























 Brazil, India, and China are all countries where mobile payments are being 
adopted rapidly. China represents a mature market for mobile payments, India 
follows closely behind, and Brazil is poised to adopt as rapidly as India in the 
near future. In response to these new realities, these three countries are 
experimenting with cybersecurity policies that apply to mobile devices. There are 
two distinct approaches in their policies and policy initiatives. China has adopted 
the Network Security Act of the People’s Republic of China, taking an 
authoritative approach that lists potentially severe actions China might take to 
resolve a security concern. Brazil and India are prioritizing data privacy and 
consumer protection in their policies. This is more akin to the European Union’s 
General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). For India and Brazil, mobile payments 
are a tool that can help to provide their underbanked populations access to 
financial services that are not currently available to them.  
 China’s approach is authoritative, centralized, and broad. China must 
mitigate threats from cyber criminals as well as from states, and so a security-
focused approach that fits within China’s authoritative policy structure makes 
sense. Brazil and India have not instituted policies that are as comprehensive as 
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China’s, but they are preparing to do so. They are primarily focused on fraud and 
cybercrime, though India is also preparing to mitigate state-level attacks through 
a more security-focused approach than Brazil.  
Brazil has instituted its Online Bill of Rights, Marco Civil da Internet (MCI) 
to manage privacy standards and developed additional agencies to manage 
growing cybersecurity threats. These threats take the form of the growing 
number of cyber incidents in Brazil and Brazil’s hosting of more events. India 
has a cybersecurity policy that has been in place since 2013 and they are 
expected to launch another one in 2020. They also have a data privacy law 
that is weaker than GDPR that has been in place since 2011. Now that GDPR 
is in full effect, India is likely to adopt an updated data privacy policy in the 
near future.  
Brazil’s Cybersecurity Policy 
  
 The increase in cyber incidents in Brazil has prompted Brazil to include 
cyber defense in their national defense strategy [Bolzan de Rezende et al, 2018]. 
In 2014, there were over 1 million cyber incidents, nearly triple the number from 
the previous year. The number of cyber incidents dropped between 2014, and 
2017, but nonetheless, each year since 2014 has seen more cyber incidents than 
any year before 2014. Geopolitically, Brazil does not face any significant state-
level threats, but the perceptions around cybercrime could undercut their efforts 
to increase the availability of financial services to the Brazilian population.  
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Though Brazil is more focused on cybercrime than state-level threats, it is 
developing its increased capabilities to counter cyber threats within their military. 
Brazil has created the Cyber Defense Command to handle the development of 
their new capabilities. This suggests that Brazil is anticipating the possibility of 
mitigating state-level cyber attacks as well as transnational organized 
cybercrime.  
Nonetheless, from a policy perspective, Brazil adopted the Online Bill of 
Rights in 2013, which is referred to as the Marco Civil da Internet (MCI). This 
legislation contained 10 guidelines for internet governance [Arnaudo, 2016]: 
1) Freedom, privacy and human rights 
 This legislation asserts that the same principle of human rights that 
are discussed in other arenas are applicable to cyberspace.  
 The right to privacy defined in the law essentially guarantees that a 
citizen’s communications through the internet are secret except for 
when they are requested by a court order.  
2) Democratic and collaborative governance 
 As a reflection of this principle, several Brazilian agencies have 







 Universality, Diversity and Innovation are not as specifically 
defined, but several initiatives in the spirit of these three are 
underway. These include increasing number of broadband and 
cellular subscriptions and the connection speeds thereof. Brazil had 
sought to reach an average broadband speed of 25 Mb/s by 2018, 
but it is behind on this goal as well as other infrastructural goals 
due to economic and political challenges [Arnaudo, 2016]. 
6) Neutrality of the network 
 Net-neutrality refers to the equal treatment of all data on the 
internet. Under net-neutrality, networks do not discriminate based 
on content, source, nor destination.  
7) Unaccountability of the network 
 This refers to the concept that only the parties responsible for illicit 
activities on the internet should be targeted in combating their 
activities, rather than the “means of access and transport” 
[Arnaudo, 2016].  
8) Functionality, security and stability 
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 Efforts to improve the security of Brazil’s networks have often 
clashed with its privacy provisions. The aforementioned agencies 
have been created to combat cyber threats (mainly cybercrime). 
Brazil is hosting more international events, such as the Olympics in 
2016, and expects to continue to do so in the future. Brazil is 
consequently preparing its law enforcement mechanisms to be able 
to deal with increased quantity of threats. Brazil has passed 
legislation calling for data localization in Brazil’s internet in 
response to Snowden’s leaks, but this is as far as Brazilian 
cybersecurity policy has gone [Arnaudo, 2016].  
9) Standardization and interoperability 
 Publicly available online databases should all be standardized and 
machine readable.  
10)  Legal and regulatory environments 
 This refers to the principle of regulating the internet as a public 
resource, a core idea behind net-neutrality as well.  
Brazil has not enacted any further legislation on cybersecurity since these 
were instituted, though there are still bills being debated in Brazil’s Congress. 
However, it is likely that infrastructural changes will be a higher priority for Brazil. 
Accomplishing their data speed goals, for example, would be more beneficial 
politically than security measures that might conflict with the principles articulated 
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in MDI. Consequently, it will likely be a few more years before new meaningful 
cybersecurity policy gets passed in Brazil. They are, however, more empowered 
to counter cyber threats in the meantime.  
India’s Cybersecurity Policy 
 
 India instituted their National Cyber Security Policy in 2013. They are also 
expected to unveil an updated cybersecurity strategy in January of 2020 outlining 
budgetary requirements to accomplish their vision of a more secure cyber 
ecosystem [Bhalla, 2019]. Their current policy, like Brazil’s and GDPR, prioritizes 
privacy and the protection of citizen’s data. It also discusses cybersecurity 
extensively as a means to provide consumer confidence. The policy calls for a 
regulatory framework for mobile devices as well as creating incentives for 
technological innovation.  
The strategies laid out are as follows, as per India’s public information guide, 
Vikaspedia:  
1) Creating a secure cyber ecosystem 
 This is intended to strengthen all entities involved in the cyber 
ecosystem. It is focused on information flow and technological 
development.  
2) Creating an assurance framework 
26 
 
 This is intended to encourage the adoption of best practices by 
private firms and normalize methods of maintaining the 
practices.  
3) Encouraging open standards 
 This is intended to improve interoperability between India’s 
solutions and international solutions.  
4) Strengthening the regulatory framework 
 This calls for a dynamic legal framework for handling 
cybersecurity concerns, especially as they arise from 
technological innovations.  
5) Creating mechanisms for security threat early warning, vulnerability 
management and response to security threats 
 This calls for a 24x7 Computer Emergency Response Team to 
handle emerging cyber threats as well as plans for worst-case 
cyber scenarios.  
6) Securing e-governance services 
 This encourages the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for 
government business and adopting best practices.  
7) Protection and resilience of critical information infrastructure 
 This includes secure software development throughout its life 




8) Promotion of research & development in cyber security 
 This calls for cooperation between industry and academia in 
cybersecurity research among other goals for improving the 
research and development process.  
9) Reducing supply chain risks 
 This calls for creating stronger relationships between vendors 
and a more robust supply chain closer to global standards. 
10)  Human resource development 
 This calls for greater education in cybersecurity. 
11)  Creating cyber security [sic] awareness 
 This calls for a creation of a national awareness program.  
12)  Developing effective public private partnerships 
 This refers to the domestic partnership between the government 
and private firms. It calls for the creation of a think-tank so that 
government and industry leaders can resolve cyber threats and 
determine how to adopt best practices.  
13)  Information sharing and cooperation 
 This refers to collaboration between law enforcement and 
national security agencies between countries.  
14)  Prioritized approach for implementation 




In addition to this policy, India has a data privacy law called Reasonable 
Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information. It 
was instituted in 2011 and required all organizations within India not to transmit 
sensitive data to any external third party that does not comport with the same 
data privacy rules [Brown, 2011]. In preparation for GDPR, India has been 
debating more updated data privacy laws. The most essential differences 
between GDPR and what India currently has is how third parties are defined to 
include domestic public entities as well (i.e. law enforcement) [Rodl & Partner, 
2018]. India therefore has strong incentive to update their data privacy laws 
along with their updated cybersecurity policy. 
China’s Cybersecurity Policy 
  
 China’s cybersecurity law, Network Security Act of the People’s Republic 
of China (中华人民共和国网络安全法), does not specify network security 
standards. Rather, it gives the Chinese government a framework from which to 
draft additional cybersecurity policy and to create regulations for devices 
accessing any network within their territory. This comes in recognition of the fact 
that very specific standards and/or policies may need to be made in order to 
handle emerging vulnerabilities as they arise. This cannot generally be 
anticipated, so this strategy seems designed to reduce the reaction time to the 




 The new law allows the Chinese government to regulate all aspects of 
network security except for military networks, which are handled by a separate 
ministry. The Chinese government will obtain information from “departments 
performing network security protection duties,” (Article 30) and this information 
must be used solely for the purpose of protection, as per the law. The law is 
sufficiently vague so that there are no clear limits other than that actions taken 
must be in the “societal public interest.” Article 39 discusses practices China 
might employ to resolve a threat or vulnerability which includes spot checks. 
Limits on what they can inspect, or demand access to, are not given.  
 The method of implementation for this law is not specified within its 
contents. It seems that the Chinese government is waiting to see how 
corporations operating in China become compliant with the precepts of the law 
and address difficulties as they arise. If this approach proves successful, it 
affords China a much more authoritative position to shape cyber norms. It 
remains to be seen which developing countries develop cybersecurity policies 
that are closer to the privacy focus of the Brazilian and Indian policies, closer to a 
both-and approach like India’s, or distinctly authoritarian like China’s.  
In Sum 
  
 Data privacy is a core principle for Brazil and India’s approaches to 
cybersecurity. Stricter data privacy laws in the European Union are now pushing 
India to develop stronger data privacy laws to comply with GDPR as it is 
necessary for many of their businesses. However, India is not neglecting the 
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security side of cyber policy. Their 2013 law has established their essential 
strategy, but India will release a new cyber policy in January of 2020. Both Brazil 
and India have data privacy at their core, but India has shifted its focus in cyber 
policy to security recently. China’s cybersecurity policy is distinctly authoritarian 
in making its security recommendations mandatory and having the right to any 
data needed to resolve a vulnerability or mitigate a threat.  
 Brazil’s policy approach emphasized privacy and can encourage 
unbanked and underbanked citizens to adopt mobile payments to access 
financial services. Brazil is simultaneously empowering their law enforcement 
agencies and military to counter cyber threats more effectively rather than using 
a policy. India is updating their current cyber policy with ambitious goals. They 
already have a data privacy policy, but it is not as strict as GDPR, and they will 
likely need to update it. Fortunately, Indian companies are already working to 
become compliant with GDPR themselves, which should expedite the process for 
their development of a new data privacy policy.  
 These distinct policy approaches to cybersecurity might all be models 
other developing countries wish to follow. Whichever policies become most 













 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a report in 2017 to 
discuss its findings on the state of mobile device security and the implications for 
Government functions. It identifies significant needs in mobile infrastructure 
security and in the devices themselves. Importantly, it identifies two gaps in the 
ability of the DHS to address these issues:  
1) Lack of authority in setting security requirements for mobile device 
carriers’ mobile infrastructure 
2) Lack of authority to demand information from carriers in order to assess 
security needs (though it can assess security based on what is provided 
voluntarily) 
The report goes on to consider several possible actions to ameliorate the inability 
to respond to threats and vulnerabilities, all of which are designed to protect 
Government operations and development and, indirectly, protect consumers. 
Notably, it recommends that the Federal Government have a stronger presence 
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in bodies that develop security standards, a more robust public-private 
partnership, and that greater regulatory and legislative action be utilized to do so.  
 Also noteworthy is that the DHS report diverges in security priorities from 
the European Union’s GDPR. It considers threats in the mobile space from the 
perspective of national security rather than consumer privacy protection. What 
DHS seeks is more akin to the intent of China’s cybersecurity law than Brazil’s, 
India’s, or the European Union’s. The relative positions of the United States and 
China in the world necessitate this sort of approach.  
 This work proposes a policy mechanism that can achieve the same level 
of security the DHS report seeks for mobile devices through a certification 
program whereby industry experts and Government agencies will contribute to a 
federally maintained set of requirements for mobile devices. Devices that 
conform to the standard prescribed in the set would be considered certified 
secure up to that standard. As a starting set, I propose implementing the 10 
policies described in Cavallari et al and forcing software updates to be applied 
automatically within a definite timeframe. These standards would immediately 
improve the security of mobile devices with respect to financial data and 
conducting financial transactions. The details of these will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
 As is often quoted in discussions of cybersecurity, there exists no ‘silver 
bullet’ to resolve any category of software or hardware security vulnerabilities. It 
is a problem to be monitored and managed over time. There is no static list of 
33 
 
security measures that can resolve issues permanently because every innovation 
brings with it new vulnerabilities. Consequently, an effective policy approach 
must provide the flexibility needed to change the set of security requirements 
with relative speed. If there were broad authority provided to DHS or some other 
Federal Government agency to enforce requirements then this could still be 
expedient, but it would be more costly and carry with it some of the same 
concerns that apply to China’s policy approach. It would require dedicated 
penetration testing to be carried out by a Federal Government agency or 
agencies to discover these issues and to resolve them. While many resources 
could be effective in discovering vulnerabilities, the makers of mobile device 
components are much better equipped to resolve them. Private organizations 
have utilized their own internal processes to do this as well as crowdsourcing 
through offering rewards for vulnerabilities private citizens identify. Private 
companies in the United States are not likely to support a measure that might 
require them to cede intellectual property or force them to consent to searches 
without warrants. It is preferable that they be provided an incentive to adopt 
security standards by means of a certification.  
 This approach can allow the United States to achieve the same level of 
security on mobile devices as it pertains to national security as China’s policy. It 
creates additional incentives for creators of mobile devices, operating systems, 
and applications to make every effort to conform to the prescribed standards by 
making this a basis for competition. Currently, mobile devices compete on their 
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features. Data privacy is becoming a more common concern for consumers 
following significant breaches in the last few years. However, true device security 
is not currently something leading mobile device makers use to compete against 
one another. This work argues that this approach is likely to produce security 
outcomes that are at least as beneficial as what is possible with more centralized 
control over the process.  
China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS) is ostensibly the organization 
that will be primarily conducting inspections and investigating vulnerabilities. In 
the United States, the approach is far more decentralized, wherein the creators 
of the components of mobile devices are responsible for improving their security. 
To illustrate the efficacy of this approach, in the 2017 WannaCry attack the 
vulnerability that the attack exploited was known to Microsoft, and a patch was 
created and distributed before the attack occurred. Unfortunately, some devices 
were not updated in time to be rendered invulnerable by the time the attack 
occurred. Nonetheless, the solution was developed and implementable before 
the attack occurred, showing a rapid response time.  
Private technology companies often crowdsource investigating the 
vulnerabilities in their systems through “bug bounty” programs that offer private 
citizens rewards for what they discover. The United States Department of 
Defense (DoD) has also tried this approach with its own websites wherein it 
invited private citizens to seek vulnerabilities in its public-facing information 
systems so they could be resolved. The result was that 138 new vulnerabilities 
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were identified beyond what DoD had identified in its internal investigations. The 
program cost $150,000, amounting to roughly $1,100 per vulnerability [USDS, 
2016].  DoD estimated that it would cost around $1 million to contract this work 
out to a cybersecurity firm. The results of this project further illustrate the benefit 
of a bottom-up approach over what might be projected for a top-down approach, 
wherein one organization is responsible for finding and fixing discovered 
vulnerabilities.  
In addition to benefits to efficacy, this approach allows the United States to 
avoid the appearance of caprice more easily. The Federal Government 
recommends against private organizations utilizing foreign-developed hardware 
or infrastructure technology, such as the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence to Sprint in 2012 regarding Huawei and ZTE technology on its 
network. The report argued that since China’s People’s Liberation Army and 
Ministry of State Security had partially funded these two companies, they had an 
inappropriate competitive advantage over domestic technology companies 
[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 2012]. Furthermore, it 
found security vulnerabilities in the form of backdoors that could be used to 
transmit information back to China. Today, in the tense political relationship 
between China and the United States, China has argued that the United States is 
simply trying to advantage its own companies by removing foreign competition.  
President Trump recently issued an executive order on Securing the 
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain on May 
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15, 2019. Shortly before that, the Five Eyes countries (The United States, The 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) finally agreed to keep 
Huawei technology outside of their respective most sensitive networks. The 
United States took this measure further with the executive order in seeking to 
prohibit any sort of transaction that might harm national interests. China has 
claimed that this represents the United States attempting to disadvantage 
competition from China via security policy. The United States has traditionally 
maintained a distinction between economic and security policy. China has not. 
Both countries have powerful and opposing visions for cyber norms. The policy 
mechanism proposed in this work would exemplify this approach and give the 
United States a stronger hand in shaping global cyber norms through 
demonstrating the efficacy of its approach to cyber policy.  
The Security Certification Program 
  
 The proposed program is a certification program whereby mobile devices 
that conform to a set of security standards will receive the certification. There are 
two types of criteria in this set: security requirements for the device and 
requirements for secure practices in the maintenance of the security of the 
operating system.  
Worldwide, Android accounts for roughly 88% of all mobile operating 
systems while iOS accounts for roughly 11.8% (Statista, 2018). In the United 
States, the difference is much smaller. Android accounts for roughly 51% of all 
mobile operating systems while iOS accounts for 48.1%. No other mobile 
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operating system is anywhere close to either of these two worldwide, and so they 
will not be discussed. Since iOS is a closed operating system, it naturally does 
not have many of the vulnerabilities Android devices have. Additionally, the fact 
that Android accounts for a larger share of mobile operating systems 
domestically and a much larger share globally makes it the target of more 
attacks. Consequently, most of the device-layer recommendations listed as a 
starting set of criteria for this policy will be applicable to Android, while the 
practices will be applicable to all mobile device makers.  
The core insight behind this list is that, as noted by Cavallari et al, while 
security updates and patches are often devised and distributed quickly, users 
can remove these changes or otherwise alter their device firmware such that it 
cannot receive these updates. Rooting or “jailbreaking” mobile devices can 
interfere with the security measures present in the device. While this already 
voids support from the device’s maker, it should also prevent the device from 
being able to participate in financial transactions. For any set of security 
requirements to be effective, it is necessary that none of them can be undone by 
the user or that if they are undone that the device is unable to make mobile 
payments. Though this will focus more on Android, this principle applies to iOS 
devices as well.  
To achieve the goal of this program devices that do not meet the criteria 
for certification should not be able to participate in mobile payments. Roughly 
44% of banking applications on the Apple App Store already attempt to detect if 
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the device is jailbroken and will not function if they detect it is. Unfortunately, 
detecting jailbreak or a rooted device is difficult. There are no certain tests for 
doing so on Android or iOS up to this point, and the methods the banking apps 
that do attempt this check utilize are mostly easy to defeat [Kellner et al, 2019].  
Requirements  
 
Under this certification program, I suggest as a starting point the following 
criteria be met to receive certification:  
1) The device should utilize RootTools open source library to check 
“busybox,” “su,” and “root command” [Android] 
2) The device should check the kernel’s build key; a value of “release-
keys” for the “ro.build.tags” must be displayed. Alternative values 
indicate the kernel has been signed with third-party keys [Android] 
a. Note: this does not necessarily mean that the device has been 
rooted; it might indicate that the developer of the Android OS 
image did not properly sign it. If it is rooted, it will display “test-
keys,” but the converse does not always hold.  
3) The device should verify vendor certificates for over-the-air updates 
[Android] 
4) The device should check for the presence of ids for developers that are 
known to develop rooting software [Android] 
a.  Cavallari et al provides a recent list, but this would have to be 
monitored and updated. 
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5) The device should check for the presence of known applications and 
software known to be used in the rooting of devices [Android and iOS] 
a. Like the 4th item, Cavallari et al provides a list for Android and 
Kellner et al provides a partial list of iOS, but this would have to 
be monitored and updated.  
6) The device should check for third party Android ROMs [Android] 
a. Legitimate device creators will use an official version of Android, 
so this is a good indicator that the operating system has been 
tampered with in some way. 
b. Again, Cavallari et al provides a list that would require 
monitoring and updating. 
7) The device should check for the “su” binary in the locations provided 
by Cavallari et al; when found, execute the command and check the 
root permissions [Android] 
a. This is a tamper indicator; nothing in the user space should 
have access to root if there has been no tampering.  
8) The device should check the permissions of the system folders, list 
provided by Cavallari et al [Android] 
a. None of the listed folders should even have read permissions; if 
they do, this is an indicator of tampering.  
9) The device should check for the presence of BusyBox [Android] 
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a. BusyBox is a utility that contains many tools that allow a user or 
malicious actor to tamper with Android.  
10)  The device should check for hidden files [Android] 
a. Cavallari et al suggest doing this by checking files with only 
execute permissions enabled. 
11)  Force updates within a defined timeframe [Android and iOS] 
12)  Prevent users from removing firmware [Android] 
a. On most Android devices this has been managed using 
Firmware Reset Protection. Samsung devices can have 
alternative firmware versions flashed onto them.  
13)  The device should prevent applications used to conduct financial 




To maintain this set, the requirements or policies added to it should satisfy 
the following three criteria:  
1) Targeted at a specific security threat or vulnerability rather than the origin 
of hardware 
2) Addressable by mobile device creators through patches or updated 
hardware in new devices 
3) Solution and business-goal agnostic 
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These criteria ensure that in the maintenance of this set that requirements 
and policies are chosen based on their demonstrable security merits, that they 
are germane to the devices themselves, and that they are not designed to 
advantage any device creator over another.  
Suggestions for Implementation 
 
Cybersecurity is a problem to be managed rather than to be solved. This 
list is a beginning point, and its requirements will have to be updated and 
reviewed continually. Government, technology industry leaders, and retailers all 
have interests in the standards recommended by the policy. For the Government, 
having a mechanism to promote security policies necessary to protect 
Government operations and mobile infrastructure. For the technology industry 
leaders, it provides them a new method to gain market share. For retailers, it 
allows them to process customers more quickly and reduce fraud liability due to 
the significantly increased difficulty of compromising payments via mobile 
devices. This means that many groups of users have interest in maintaining 
global device security from different perspectives.  
To merge these interests, the Security Certification Program should be 
managed by the Department of Homeland Security. Industry leaders, especially 
makers of mobile devices, and cybersecurity researchers would be the actors 
most able to detect security issues. The makers of mobile devices would be the 
most able to resolve security concerns on their respective devices. The 
Department of Homeland Security would provide the certification, but industry 
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leaders and researchers would advocate for the security standards and policies 
they believe would best counter emerging cyber threats. This would allow the 
United States to place requirements without having to disclose the details of why 
it is necessary when necessary.  
Industry leaders, including both the technology companies that create 
mobile devices and those that create applications, technologies, and services 
with which they interact, would be important contributors to the set of 
requirements in this program. The instances of fraud experienced by retailers 
and restaurants would also be instructive as to new policies or requirements that 
need to be added to the set.  
Compliance with the set could be checked with automated checks for the 
required settings each for Android and iOS (and any other operating system to 
which this becomes applicable in the future). This would simplify the process to 
demonstrate compliance so as to minimize the impact of procedural aspects of 
the program.  
Security Advantages 
 
 In this section, this work argues that the approach of this program can 
accomplish the same levels of security as China’s policy while still respecting 
intellectual property and privacy. It would also be less expensive than China’s 
approach, operating through incentives instead of mandates. In particular, this 
approach incentivizes innovations in security from those best positioned to make 
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those innovations. Based on what was demonstrated by a Department of 
Defense program designed to resolve vulnerabilities in its public information 
system, crowdsourcing vulnerability detection is significantly less costly. This 
approach will also give the United States a more authoritative position to shape 
cyber norms, which would afford the United States a stronger position to 
advocate for international security policies that speak to the interests of the 
United States as they arise.  
Centralized vs. Decentralized Approach 
 
 In 2016 the Department of Defense (DoD) received approval from the 
Pentagon to conduct a program dubbed “Hack the Pentagon.” The result of it 
demonstrated the efficacy of a distributed, decentralized approach to finding 
security vulnerabilities. Organizations as well as private citizens were invited to 
attempt to find vulnerabilities in the Department of Defense’s websites and 
information systems. This ‘bug bounty’ approach to security was novel for DoD. 
They contracted HackerOne, a bug bounty platform startup, to run the program, 
and DoD used their own digital services team and involved vendors to resolve 
the issues as they were found.  
 Noting that the estimated cost to hire a firm to perform the same task, the 
results were spectacular. A total of 138 vulnerabilities were found, all of which 
were missed by DoD’s own screening. The very first vulnerability report was 
received in only 13 minutes. Over 1,000 individuals participated in the program 
and the total cost for the program, including what was payed out in bounties and 
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the resolution of the vulnerabilities, was roughly $150,000. The cost to hire a firm 
to find and resolve these was estimated at over $1,000,000.  
 The impressive result of this program has prompted DoD to implement 
more such programs. Other government agencies and stakeholders are also 
considering the decentralized approach of crowdsourcing the finding of 
vulnerabilities. The clearest contrast that can be drawn between the 
decentralized approach and the centralized approach is the difference in the 
cost. However, a priori, a decentralized approach has additional advantages as 
well.  
 The first advantage is the potential to draw on a broad knowledge base 
with many specialties and perspectives. In a centralized approach, either with a 
single contractor or with a single government agency being responsible for 
finding and resolving security threats, the knowledge base is restricted to the 
agency or organization. Offering bounties to individuals is less expensive than 
formally contracting the work out or paying other employees to perform the task. 
Of course, crowdsourcing is not a replacement for an organization’s own 
inspection of their products or services. It is, however, a very helpful addition.  
Technology companies frequently utilize bug-bounties and the 
crowdsourcing approach to find bugs and vulnerabilities in their systems. Under 
this certification program, this advantage would be maintained insofar as makers 
of mobile devices continue to utilize the crowdsourcing approach in addition to 
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their own processes. Any contributor with a meaningful innovation or insight 
could improve the overall state of mobile device security.  
Comparison to Plastic Cards 
 
 Plastic cards are significantly less secure than mobile devices for mobile 
payments. The main source of this insecurity is the medium itself. A plastic credit 
card has all or nearly all of the information required to make a payment, 
depending on if a zip code is required. This means a stolen card is immediately 
available to be used to make a payment. This is not true for mobile devices; 
Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Samsung Pay, which do not store credit card 
information on the devices themselves.  
 Mobile payments in the United States generally use Near-Field 
Communication (NFC) to make the transaction. In the case of mobile wallets, 
which account for the majority of mobile payments, the user connects a credit or 
debit card to their mobile wallet. Depending on the service, the user might enter a 
pin or use their fingerprint when they initiate the transaction. From the user’s 
perspective, this is all they need to do. With Apple Pay, the user uses their 
fingerprint or face to validate the transaction. With Google Pay, the user simply 
needs to unlock the device (which can be done with fingerprint, face, or pin).  
With Apple Pay the generated token is stored in a Secure Element (SE) 
chip, which then generates a cryptogram. The merchant sends the request to 
their bank, which then forwards the request to the payer’s bank or payment 
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provider. Since what was transmitted is not a true account number but rather a 
reference to one, the payment network will send it on to the token service 
provider (typically a third-party vendor), who will then provide the true account 
number. This then means that payment provider can authorize or deny the 
transaction and send the notification back to the merchant. Google Pay is quite 
similar; the essential difference is that instead of using a physical SE chip in the 
phone it uses Google’s own cloud servers. The security tradeoff is that there is 
less risk from a lost or stolen device but there is more risk due to real card data 
being stored in Google’s cloud servers. The phone itself thereby emulates a 
physical card by means of that tap.  However, in both approaches, even if a 
hacker or malicious actor intercepts the information transmitted in the 
transaction, they are not able to glean the card number, the account to which it is 
tied, nor any other personally identifiable information (PII). This makes mobile 
payments significantly more secure than plastic cards, where a lost or stolen card 
can immediately be used for a fraudulent transaction.  
 Chip cards have been effective in reducing fraud from in-person payments 
as they are very difficult to counterfeit compared to magnetic strips. According to 
Visa, instances of fraudulent payments caused by counterfeiting plastic cards 
had dropped by 82% since the adoption of chip cards in 2015 and November of 
2018. Chip cards essentially utilize the same tokenization strategy as mobile 
payments. The differences in their security come from the use of the card itself.  
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 Stolen cards present a much bigger security challenge than stolen 
devices. This is because card-not-present (CNP) transactions are still possible 
and easy to do with a stolen card. With a stolen mobile device, it is much harder. 
At a minimum, the device must be unlocked. The card information linked to the 
mobile wallet is not stored on the actual phone, further limiting the ability to 
commit fraudulent payments with a stolen device. Furthermore, Android and iOS 
devices both have functionality to erase all data and/or render the device 
unusable to whomever stole it. These measures create layers of security beyond 
the transaction itself and make mobile Point-of-Sale (PoS) a distinctly more 
secure payment tool.  
 Due to current levels of adoption of mobile payments in the United States, 
there is insufficient data to make a meaningful comparison between the 
instances of fraud between the two. In a few years this will be clearer, but from 
the available information, the instances of fraudulent payments from plastic cards 
should be greater than the number from mobile payments.  
 In addition to security, the mobile payments are quicker for a user to enter. 
This is because with chip cards the card must remain inserted while the 
transaction is being processed, whereas with a mobile device the user is finished 





Global Cyber Norms  
 
 The term ‘cyber norms’ refers to the notions of the acceptable use of 
cyberspace. At present, cyber weapons as well as the massive amounts of user 
data in the internet ecosystem have posed new questions about what is 
appropriate in cyberspace and what is not. Data privacy concerns have been at 
the forefront of normative thinking with states implementing policies targeted 
toward protecting consumer data. However, several other normative questions 
remain. Stuxnet illustrated that cyber attacks could be used effectively to carry 
out objectives that previously required a kinetic operation. Unlike other non-
conventional weapons like nuclear arms, global powers tend to keep their true 
capabilities secret with respect to weapons. Another set of norms in cyberspace 
is the set surrounding what is acceptable for security policy.  
Fortunately, for this last set, this certification program could help the 
United States define this more formally. The United States has derided China for 
using its security policy to accomplish economic goals. Huawei, the Chinese 
technology giant, receives significant funding from the People’s Liberation Army, 
China’s National Security Commission, and an additional Chinese intelligence 
agency, according to the Central Intelligence Agency [Doffman, 2019]. The 
United Kingdom’s Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre has claimed that it 
also found issues that were sufficiently concerning to them that they do not 
believe they can safely include Huawei technology in networks in the United 
Kingdom while maintaining their own domestic network security.  
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Initially, the Five-Eyes countries were not as quick to make 
pronouncements following the claims of the United States about the risks of 
incorporating Huawei technology on domestic networks. However, the apparent 
confirmation of the funding relationship between Chinese intelligence and 
Huawei was compelling, as this violates a norm of abstaining from using security 
policy for economic advancement. With the initial claims from the United States, 
it was possible to infer a motive related to the trade war between the United 
States and China. However, upon more information becoming available, the 
normative logic of preserving a distinction between security interests and 
economic interests in security policy made the decision obvious.  
The United States having a formal policy mechanism will make avoiding 
such an appearance easier. The criteria provided for what requirements can be 
included in the policy prevent a blanket ban on Huawei technology, but it does 
not prevent excluding it on the basis of the presence of a backdoor, which is the 
specific security concern associated with this issue.  
Business Interests 
 
 In addition to the security benefits of this policy, there are incentives for 
retailers and restaurants as well as technology companies and makers of mobile 
devices to support this policy. Retailers stand to benefit through less expected 
cost for fraud liability and the ability to process consumer payments faster. 
Technology companies will have a greater platform for their security innovations 
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 A consequence of the security benefits of mobile devices is that though 
the fraud liability is the same as it would be for plastic cards the expected amount 
of fraud is less. These benefits reduce the overall risk to retailers and restaurants 
of having to cover these costs. Reduced costs could in turn allow retailers to 
reduce their prices and stimulate demand. This also helps to offset the cost of 
adopting the technologies needed to facilitate point-of-sale technology. Retailers 
and Restaurants have already adopted these technologies to a large extent. 
Given this, it is in the interest of retailers and restaurants for users to continue to 
increase their utilization of mobile payments and that there be a mechanism to 
standardize their security requirements and policies. This would continue to 
minimize instances of fraud and thereby their exposure to fraud liability.  
With respect to in-person card-present transactions, restaurants and 
retailers can be held liable for fraud if they process a transaction that they believe 
to be fraudulent, fail to require a chip card, or fail to require a signature. They are 
empowered to require identification and to inspect the card being used to prevent 
a fraudulent transaction. With mobile devices, the layers of security should 
continue to keep the amount of fraud less than what has occurred by cards. 





 Technology companies that do not create mobile devices would have a 
significant role to play in the certification program. Cybersecurity firms and 
companies that develop the technologies, apps, or services with which mobile 
devices interact would all be vital players in identifying security concerns that 
may need to be addressed. They would have an additional platform to advocate 
for their cybersecurity innovations and they could use their innovations as a basis 
for competition and thereby an avenue to increase their market share.  
In Sum 
 
 The proposed certification program is a policy mechanism that would allow 
the United States to manage cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities as they 
arise. An initial set of requirements was provided designed to target prerequisites 
for known attacks to compromise mobile device transaction security. The 
certification program would fulfill some of the needs identified in the Department 
of Homeland Security’s Study on Mobile Device Security in providing a formal 
mechanism for industry leaders and Government to ensure that security policy 
caters to the needs they both identify with respect to device security.  
It may remove other needs the report identified by rendering the need for 
additional regulatory authority unnecessary. If the makers of mobile devices are 
sufficiently incentivized to maintain certification for their devices, or to create new 
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devices that are certified, then there is no need for a more authoritative hand. 
This is much more politically feasible while achieving the same levels of security.  
 There are several security advantages to this approach. Mobile devices 
are more secure than plastic cards and having a formal security mechanism 
might help to improve consumer confidence in their security. Contrasting it with 
China’s cybersecurity policy’s centralized approach, this policy would likely allow 
the United States to find and resolve security concerns at least as efficiently as 
China’s policy. It would also preserve the traditional normative distinction 
between pursuing security interests and economic interests in cybersecurity 
policy. This would give the United States a more authoritative position to shape 
global norms going forward, as there are still several open questions about the 















 This work presents a policy mechanism for the United States to manage 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threats on mobile devices. Current trends in 
adoption of mobile payments in the United States indicate that mobile payments 
are likely to be a main form of payment in the near future. This makes the need 
to develop a cybersecurity policy for mobile devices more urgent. In addition to 
the utilization of mobile devices by consumers, the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) Study on Mobile Device Security identified the need for greater 
ability to manage mobile device security to protect Government operations. It 
also called for increases in the public/private partnership between industry 
leaders and the DHS and giving DHS greater regulatory authority in resolving 
security concerns.  
 Given these motivations, this work proposes a certification program be 
created whereby a set of criteria for certification must be met by a device for the 
device to be certified. The criteria would be based on best practices and the most 
recent discoveries in device vulnerabilities. A suggested set of criteria to begin 
this program is provided. These are based on recent research into removing the 
security innovations mobile device creators push or being able to execute code 
at a higher level of privilege than should be possible through rooting or 
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jailbreaking the device. Detecting rooting or jailbreaking is a challenging task but 
vital to device security. The list includes several methods for detecting if an 
Android device is rooted. Jailbreak detection is similarly challenging on iOS and 
current app-based methods for doing so have proven to be easily defeated. 
Consequently, this is an essential target for the certification program.  
 To maintain the program, three criteria should be met for new 
requirements or policies to be added. The requirements or policies should be:  
1) Targeted at a specific security threat or vulnerability rather than the origin 
of hardware 
2) Addressable by mobile device creators through patches or updated 
hardware in new devices 
3) Solution and business-goal agnostic 
These criteria preserve the advantages of this policy approach over China’s 
approach, including a decentralized approach to discovering security 
vulnerabilities, strong incentives for industry leaders to contribute actively, and no 
additional mandates or legal requirements imposed on the private sector.  
While mobile device security is certainly taken seriously in the United 
States both by technology companies and by the Government, there is often 
misalignment in the problems they each seek to solve. Consequently, a program 
over which the Government has final say in certification but where no legal 
requirements are imposed optimizes the ability to develop solutions that cater to 
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both sets of goals. For businesses, consumer protection and market share are 
always underlying incentives. For governments, ensuring the safety and integrity 
of operations is vital to their missions. In the consumer market, being able to 
guarantee a minimum level of security across all devices that conduct 
transactions is advantageous to both goals.  
Technology companies tend to utilize programs like bug bounties to 
resolve cybersecurity concerns. This has proven to be a cost-efficient addition to 
internal security evaluations, both for technology companies and for 
governments. The Hack the Pentagon program put on through the Department of 
Defense was able to find 138 additional vulnerabilities for roughly 15% of the cost 
of hiring a single firm to perform the same task. This illustrates the efficacy of the 
decentralized approach. This can be achieved through the certification program, 
where many entities are involved in finding vulnerabilities, but not in the 
centralized approach of China.  
Business interests would be well served by this policy approach as well. 
Retailers and restaurants can be held liable for fraudulent transactions that occur 
in their establishments if they fail to follow procedures set forth by payment card 
providers. While chip cards have reduced these instances dramatically over what 
was seen with simple magnetic strip cards, they have not eliminated them, and 
are still much easier to compromise than smartphones. The physical card itself 
can be used immediately in most cases if stolen, which is not true for a mobile 
device, which must be unlocked at a minimum to be of use for payments. For the 
56 
 
makers of mobile devices, this provides an additional avenue for competition and 
therefore increased opportunity to grow market share.  
The BRIC countries have seen particularly spectacular growth in mobile 
device and mobile payment adoption. China represents a mature state of mobile 
payments being used as a primary tool of consumption. India is the fastest 
growing mobile payments market in the world, and Brazil is preparing for a 
similarly impressive increase in mobile device utilization for payments. They have 
each implemented cyber policies based on their specific needs and geopolitical 
positions. China’s is focused on security with little regard for privacy, India is 
incorporating both, and Brazil is distinctly privacy-focused from a policy 
perspective. As all of these countries work to position themselves to counter 
state-level cyber activities as well as criminal level, they will have to incorporate 
more security-specific policy.  
The United States, like China, must be focused on security in its cyber 
policy as well. It represents the largest economy in the world as well as a global 
hegemon. Consequently, it must focus both on cybercrime as well as state-based 
cyber threats. This policy allows the United States to do so effectively and will 










 From a policy perspective, while this policy can accomplish improved 
minimum standards for mobile device security, it does not solve the regulatory 
concerns the DHS report voiced over mobile networks. The approach presented 
here is not well suited for this task, but it is also necessary.  
 From a cybersecurity perspective, the methods for two-factor 
authentication are less effective than in other applications. Biometrics 
(‘something you are’) has the disadvantage of being unchangeable but can be 
just as compromised as a password in a digital form. If a malicious actor has the 
device and the password, two-factor authentication methods that send an SMS 
message as well as requiring a password are no more secure than single-factor 
authentication. This makes two-factor authentication significantly less useful on 
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